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 Abstract—An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key 
distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the 
quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-
reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the 
security of the QKD system if appropriate safeguards are not 
installed or if they can be fooled by Eve. We present a risk 
analysis of such attacks based on extensive spectral 
measurements, such as transmittance, reflectivity, and detection 
sensitivity of some critical components used in typical QKD 
systems. Our results indicate the existence of wavelength regimes 
where the attacker gains considerable advantage as compared to 
launching an attack at 1550 nm. We also propose 
countermeasures to reduce the risk of such attacks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As of today, quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the 
most promising applications of quantum information 
technology [1-3]. In its most basic form, QKD facilitates two 
parties Alice and Bob to exchange a key for encrypting their 
messages in an information-theoretically secure manner. In 
theory, any eavesdropping during their key exchange 
‘protocol’ introduces errors in the measured data, thus 
disclosing the presence of their adversary Eve. If the amount 
of errors is not too high, Alice and Bob can try to distill a 
shorter but secret key. Otherwise, they abort the QKD protocol 
and try to use another quantum channel (or communicate 
later). The confidentiality of their messages is thereby never 
compromised.  
In practice however, the theoretical ‘security’ model may 
not be properly implemented, or the security proof, which is at  
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the heart of this security model may be based on incorrect or 
insufficient assumptions. In such cases, the eavesdropper may 
perform an attack and acquire (partial or full) knowledge of 
the key without causing too many errors, thus breaching the 
security of the QKD system. 
Such theory-practice deviations usually arise due to 
technical deficiencies and operational imperfections in the 
system hardware or firmware. The field of quantum hacking 
investigates such deviations [4-6] and many proof-of-principle 
quantum hacking attacks have been devised and performed on 
practical QKD systems in the last decade [7-21].  
A vast majority of current QKD implementations are fiber-
optical, i.e., different system components are connected 
together by fiber-optic interfaces. For ideal components and 
interfaces, all of the input light may be perfectly transmitted to 
the output. But in reality, while traveling through an interface 
or inside a component, a non-zero portion of the light will be 
reflected or scattered back. To be more precise, a change of 
refractive index during propagation induces Fresnel reflection, 
while density fluctuations in the material of the optical fibers 
cause Rayleigh or Brillouin scattering. The amount of 
reflection and scattering may depend on the wavelength and 
intensity of the input light. 
A bright pulse launched from the quantum channel (by Eve) 
into a QKD subsystem, e.g., Alice, would encounter multiple 
reflection and scattering sites. A stream of reflected pulses can 
therefore be expected to propagate out of Alice’s device on the 
quantum channel. By carefully analyzing this back-reflected 
light, Eve could acquire knowledge of the properties and 
functionality of a component inside Alice. Fig. 1(a) shows Eve 
launching such an attack from the quantum channel with the 
intention of knowing the bases selected by Alice. 
The first hint of such a large pulse attack was provided in 
Ref. [22]. The basic ideas and applicability conditions for 
implementing a realistic large pulse attack were extensively 
investigated one year later [23]. This work reported the results 
of a simple experimental interrogation of the ‘static’ settings 
of Alice and Bob devices and also proposed several realistic 
countermeasures. In 2006, these ideas were generalized under 
the name of Trojan-horse attacks [24]. These attacks were 
again experimentally investigated, albeit still in a static sense, 
with a focus on the plug-and-play architecture [22, 25, 26]. 
Recently, both realistic and real-time Trojan-horse attacks 
on practical QKD implementations have attracted considerable 
attention [19-21]. The implementations include commercial 
QKD systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique [27], and 
Cygnus from SeQureNet [28]. Notably, the wavelength chosen 
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for performing the attack in all these works is (in the vicinity 
of) 1550 nm, the standard telecom wavelength which is also 
employed by Alice and Bob for their communication. The 
feasibility and constraints of launching Trojan-horse attacks at 
different wavelengths have not been explored, especially from 
an experimental perspective. Such a study is crucial for a 
comprehensive analysis of the threat of these attacks and 
(re)design of suitable prevention mechanisms and 
countermeasures. 
In this paper, we analyze the spectral behaviour of a variety 
of optical devices relevant to QKD, ranging from some single 
passive components to a complete QKD subsystem. In all 
these investigations, we also carefully assess the associated 
security risks from Trojan-horse attacks. The paper is 
organized as follows: in section II, we discuss a few concepts 
and ideas that define the Trojan-horse attack and also form the 
basis of its success or failure. In section III, we present the 
results of our experimental investigation into the spectral 
behaviour of two frequently-used components in practical 
QKD systems: a circulator and an isolator. Note that the latter 
is actually even a well-known countermeasure against Trojan-
horse attacks on one-way QKD systems [23, 24]. We then 
describe some simple spectral measurements that were 
performed on the receiver system in Clavis2 (Bob), in the 
quest of improving the attack presented in Ref. [21]. In 
particular, we also show the results of our estimation of the 
spectral sensitivity of single-photon avalanche diodes 
(SPADs) in the 1700 - 1800 nm range. These SPADs are used 
by Bob to detect the quantum signals from Alice. In section IV 
and V, we sum up our work, provide an outlook, and finally 
discuss some countermeasures.  
II. BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS 
As illustrated in Fig.1, back-reflections that carry 
information of the applied bases are measured by Eve, for 
instance using state discrimination methods [29], as and when 
they return to the attack apparatus. If Eve could indeed do this 
entire operation without alerting Alice and Bob, she could 
break the security of any prepare-and-measure protocol 
(including both discrete and continuous variable protocols) [1, 
30-32, 35]. However, as mentioned before, such vulnerability 
has been known [23, 24] for some time.  
Two common practical measures to prevent or catch 
Trojan-horse attacks in action are to add an isolator or install a 
‘watchdog’ detector, respectively, at the entrance of the Alice 
subsystem. While an ideal isolator would passively torpedo 
any Trojan-horse attack by a complete extinction of Eve’s 
pulses – no matter how bright – dispatched into Alice, an ideal 
watchdog or monitoring detector would actively raise an alarm 
whenever any unknown or non-designated optical signals 
arrive into Alice. 
However, while practical isolators have only a finite 
isolation, which may even be lower at wavelengths that are 
outside the ‘design’ wavelength bands, practical monitoring 
detectors have a vanishing responsivity outside a finite 
spectral range. In other words, there may exist a wavelength, 
or a set of wavelengths, at which an isolator can only partially 
stop a Trojan-horse pulse, or the response of the monitoring 
system is not sufficient to trigger the alarm. Additionally, if 
the back-reflection levels from one or more optical interfaces 
inside the QKD system at such wavelengths are also high, the 
risk of a successful Trojan-horse attack is naturally escalated. 
In the subsections below, we elaborate this risk further using 
some simple examples. 
 
A. Back-reflections and Eve’s photon budget 
In a Trojan-horse attack, Eve’s light goes back and forth 
through the attacked subsystem. Moreover, at least one of the 
onward Trojan-horse pulse or the back-reflected pulse must 
probe or pass through the basis selector, e.g., a phase 
modulator [21]. The onward and reverse paths (which may not 
be the same necessarily [19]) decide the insertion loss, and 
together with the back-reflection level, determine the total 
attenuation suffered by Eve’s pulse in the double pass. With 
the knowledge of these values, Eve can estimate the number of 
photons to expect on average (Eve), in the back-reflected pulse 
of interest as it travels to her on the quantum channel.  
In the following, we explain the concept of Eve’s photon 
budget by means of a numerical example. We assume the 
attack wavelength to be λ ~ 1550 nm, a binary basis choice, 
and that Eve   4 suffices for accurately knowing the probed 
choice of the basis. We also assume the source of the back-
reflection of interest to be an open fiber-optic interface, e.g., 
the glass-air interface of an unused port of a fiber coupler. 
This has actually been used for attacking a continuous variable 
QKD system [19]. For standard optical fiber components, a 
Fresnel reflection of around 4% (reflectivity ℛ  − 14 dB) is 
obtained from such an interface. Let us assume that this 
coupler is located inside Alice (of a generic QKD system) in 
such a manner that the total insertion loss from the quantum 
channel to this coupler and back is 𝐼𝐿  − 46 dB. Given this, 
the total attenuation suffered by Eve’s light can be calculated 
as ℛ + 𝐼𝐿  − 60 dB. Eve’s Trojan-horse pulse needs to have 
 
Fig. 1.  Scheme of a Trojan-horse attack. Eve attacks Alice by sending bright 
Trojan-horse pulses to know the bases selected by the latter during the 
operation of the QKD protocol. This information is carried by the back-
reflected pulses coming out of Alice. As a rule of thumb, Eve must avoid 
disturbing the legitimate quantum signals travelling from Alice to Bob as 
much as possible since she is interested in knowing only the basis settings.   
Only the most relevant components are shown in Alice and Bob for the sake 
of clarity. Fig. 6(a) shows a more detailed schematic of Bob. 
 
 
roughly 4106 photons (when it enters the QKD system) so 
that the back-reflected pulse of interest would carry the 
necessary 4 photons on average.  
However, if Alice also uses an isolator providing an 
isolation (transmission in reverse direction) of 50 dB at λ ~ 
1550 nm to protect the system against Trojan-horse attacks, 
Eve’s photon budget needs to be raised by at least 5 orders of 
magnitude (>41011 photons). Such powerful pulses, apart 
from being quite easily detectable, may even be on the verge 
of the damage thresholds of the components or interconnects 
inside Alice. While a carefully-induced damage [7] may help 
the eavesdropper, in general, it is simply going to render the 
QKD device or the communication channel useless and thus 
does not benefit Eve. 
 
B. Foiling Alice’s safeguards 
The values of reflectivity, insertion loss, and isolation 
mentioned above are typically specified only for, or around, 
the design wavelength of the components. At other 
wavelengths, they are likely to differ. If the isolation is much 
lower at a wavelength λEve (far from 1550 nm), then Eve need 
not significantly raise the power of the Trojan-horse pulses. If 
Eve is fortunate, a higher reflectivity and/or lower insertion 
loss may be obtained at λEve resulting in a lower attenuation of 
her light through Alice. In such a case, the isolator would 
effectively be providing only a false sense of security because 
the peak power of Eve’s Trojan-horse pulses would not be 
much higher than the value without the isolator (while Eve  
4 is still obtained). 
As mentioned before, using a monitoring detector is another 
common method to catch real-time Trojan-horse attacks. In 
fact, they are indispensable for plug-and-play schemes since 
the light travels back and forth between Bob and Alice 
(implying that isolators cannot be used). For instance, a major 
part of the incoming light is diverted (using a 90/10 coupler) 
to an array of classical detectors in Clavis2-Alice [33]. Flaws 
which may allow the operation of these detectors to be 
manipulated by Eve have been recently discovered [20].  
However, even without the flaws, a monitoring detector 
could be spectrally unresponsive outside a finite wavelength 
band. This increases the vulnerability against Trojan-horse 
attacks. To elaborate using another simple and fictitious 
example, let us assume that the monitoring detector has a 
negligible spectral sensitivity at λEve, in particular, the 
responsivity (λEve) < 10−4 A/W. Also, assume the minimum 
dark noise current ID of the detector is ~10 nA. If Eve sends a 
Trojan-horse pulse with a peak power1 PEve ~ 100 W, the 
maximum resultant photocurrent in the classical detector is IPh 
 (λEve)  PEve = 10 nA. This implies the monitoring 
system’s response to the Trojan-horse pulse is likely to get 
buried in the dark noise, allowing Eve to stay concealed.  
The only other indicators of Eve’s attack on a QKD system 
are an increased quantum bit error rate (QBER) and irregular 
 
1 Depending on the optical pulse width T, the average number of photons 
per pulse is given by the expression λEve PEve T / ℏ𝑐 
detection statistics, and both of these quantities are typically 
estimated by Bob in classical postprocessing [2, 3]. A Trojan-
horse attack on Alice – exploiting either inadequate isolation 
or insufficient monitoring system’s response – is unlikely to 
affect Bob (and therefore the QBER and/or the detection 
statistics). In other words, Eve has a good chance to obtain 
information about the complete raw key without Alice’s and 
Bob’s knowledge.  
 
C. Avoiding discovery by Bob 
Trojan-horse attacks have traditionally been known as a 
threat to only the Alice subsystem, as our discussion so far has 
also indicated. This is mainly due to the fact that in BB84, the 
most popular and widely-used QKD protocol, Bob anyway 
reveals his basis choice during the step of reconciliation [1-3]. 
Probing Bob’s basis selection by means of Trojan-horse attack 
is therefore completely useless for Eve. 
However, in the SARG04 protocol [34, 35], the secret bit is 
given by Bob's basis choice. As demonstrated experimentally 
in Ref. [21], this basis choice can be inferred with more than 
90% accuracy even with a few back-reflected photons (Eve   
3). Nevertheless, the total attenuation suffered by Eve’s pulse 
is of the order of −57 dB due to which, Eve has to send 
Trojan-horse pulses containing at least 1.5106 photons into 
Bob. Unfortunately for Eve, Bob also contains a pair of gated 
SPADs and her bright pulses lead to a tremendous amount of 
afterpulsing [16] in these SPADs. Afterpulsing is caused due 
to the filling of the carrier traps which decay exponentially, 
causing uncorrelated clicks in a later gate [36, 37]. This 
elevates the dark noise level and hence, the QBER measured 
by Bob and Alice. As mentioned in the beginning, QKD 
systems normally abort the protocol if the QBER crosses a 
certain security threshold. Thus, it is strongly in Eve’s interest 
to keep in check the increase in the afterpulsing probabilities 
in the SPADs due to her Trojan-horse pulses.  
In some sense therefore, the SPADs in Bob act like a 
monitor against Trojan-horse attacks. Moreover, just like for 
the monitoring detector, the quantum efficiency of an SPAD is 
also a function of the wavelength of light impinging upon 
them. Typically, SPADs are designed to have their peak 
efficiency of detection in the telecom wavelength bands [38]. 
Although the physics that explains the concept of efficiency 
differs from that of afterpulsing, a lowered efficiency at a 
wavelength longer than the peak wavelength (i.e., λ > 1550 
nm) should also imply a lower probability of afterpulsing. 
This conjecture is based on the fact that the longer-wavelength 
photons are less energetic to cross the bandgap (optimized for 
1550 nm). The propensity to populate carrier traps and cause 
afterpulses should likewise be lesser. In fact, CW illumination 
around 1950 nm has even been used to depopulate the carrier 
traps by means of photoionization [39].  
Eve could therefore choose a wavelength > 1550 nm to 
prepare the attack pulses (say λEve ~ 1700 nm), where the 
afterpulsing induced by the bright Trojan-horse pulses in the 
SPADs is considerably lower than at 1550 nm. She could even 
further mitigate the afterpulsing by adding CW light at λ ~ 
1950 nm. An attack strategy exploiting other known features 
Fig. 2. Spectral transmission and measurement of light through different fiber-
optical devices. a) The circulator allows optical transmission from port 1 to 2 
and from port 2 to 3. Ideally, transmission is highly suppressed for the reverse 
directions. b) The isolator is supposed to have minimal attenuation in forward 
direction and maximum attenuation in reverse direction. c) We tested different 
devices (DUTs), from a single isolator to a complete QKD subsystem, with 
the objective of measuring the spectral transmittance or reflectivity of these 
devices. This was done by connecting them to an optical spectrum analyzer 
(OSA) and supercontinuum source in different configurations. d) The 
following spectral traces are shown: direct supercontinuum output (black); 
transmitted outputs of an isolator in both forward and reverse directions 
(orange and purple), output of the circulator at port 2 while the supercontiuum 
source is connected to port 1 and vice versa (red and blue). OSA model used 
for measurement: Ando AQ-6315A. 
of the SPADs, e.g., deadtime, inability to resolve photon 
numbers, etc. [27] could then be used to enhance Eve’s gain. 
To elaborate, Eve may obtain a significant portion of the raw 
key at a much reduced attack rate (that directly translates into 
a lowered QBER). In such cases, the privacy amplification 
performed by Alice and Bob at the end of the protocol may 
not suffice to erase Eve’s knowledge. Such a result would 
have a major significance since SPADs are currently the most 
popular devices for single-photon detection in discrete 
variable QKD. Even more, entanglement-based protocol 
(including BB84) implementations can also be compromised. 
To illustrate the last points, let us consider a hypothetical 
example of a state-of-the-art QKD link where Alice and Bob 
share a secret key by measuring polarization entangled pairs as 
per the BB84 protocol. Let us assume that without Eve’s 
attack, Bob and Alice incur a QBER q0 = 0.01 and estimate 
the fraction of single-pair and uncorrelated multi-pair events 
[3] as y0 = 0.70. As per security proofs [40-42], the QBER 
threshold above which Alice and Bob should abort the 
communication is qabort ≈ 0.11. Furthermore, assume that a 
variation δymax = 0.15 in the estimation of y is allowed by the 
QKD system2. If the Trojan-horse attack, using the ideas 
discussed above, results in Eve obtaining correlations above 
48% with the error-corrected key, and Alice and Bob 
observing the parameters under attack as q1 = 0.05 and y1 = 
 
2 This value of δymax is used by Clavis2 for example. 
0.79, then the security of the QKD system is violated. This is 
because q1 < qabort and δy (= |y1/y0 – 1| = 0.13) < δymax would 
not raise any alarm, while the quantity to be subtracted during 
privacy amplification (calculated based on equation 40 in Ref. 
[3]) is 47.8% which is slightly smaller than Eve’s knowledge. 
III. SPECTRAL MEASUREMENTS 
In the previous section, we have developed the motivation 
to investigate possible security loopholes that arise from the 
behaviour of the QKD system at uncharacterized wavelengths 
and aid the Trojan-horse attack of Eve. In this section, we 
present our results on comprehensively testing the broadband 
transmittance and reflectivity of different fiber-optical 
components, namely a circulator and an isolator. We also 
perform some simple measurements on a whole receiver 
system (Clavis2-Bob). Finally, we also look into the spectral 
efficiency of SPADs in the 1700 - 1800 nm range, where the 
afterpulsing is conjectured to be low.  
Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) show the schematic of a circulator and an 
isolator. Fig. 2(c) shows a schematic of the possible setups 
employed for the different measurements. For instance, to 
perform a spectral reflectivity measurement, the optical 
spectrum analyzer (OSA) could be connected to the device 
under test (DUT) via a balanced fiber splitter (green/dotted 
line). For a transmission measurement, the broadband light 
simply passes through the DUT (blue/dashed line). 
As broadband source, we employed supercontinuum 
generation in a photonic crystal fiber [43]. A solid core 
photonic crystal fiber was pumped at a wavelength of 1064 
nm to produce a broad and bright optical spectrum – the 
supercontinuum – stretching from below 600 nm to above 
1700 nm [44]. The black trace in Fig. 2(d) shows the output in 
the 1000 - 1750 nm range, which we found to be the most 
interesting and relevant for a majority of the experiments 
presented in this section. The small dip around 1400 nm is 
typical for glass fibers due to infrared absorption. Nonetheless, 
the supercontinuum is > 40 dB above the noise floor of the 
optical spectrum analyzer (OSA) in the 1000 - 1650 nm range.  
 
A. Spectral transmittance of relevant fiber-optic components 
We have measured the spectral characteristics of one fiber- 
optic circulator and three different fiber-optic isolators which 
are optimized for 1550 nm. As shown in Fig. 2(a), the 
circulator allows an optimal transmission from port 1 to port 2 
and from port 2 to port 3 which is used, for instance, to 
separate counter-propagating signals. At 1550 nm, the 
minimum isolation, defined as the transmission from port 2 to 
port 1 or from port 3 to port2, as per the datasheet is 40 dB. 
The return loss is >60 dB and the insertion loss <1.1 dB.   
Isolators were already introduced in the previous section 
and as illustrated in Fig. 2(b), they are normally used as a one-
way optical transmission component.  As per the datasheets of 
three tested isolators, it should be possible to obtain a 
minimum isolation (transmission in reverse direction) of 40 
dB, return loss of >55 dB, and insertion loss of <1.0 dB. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Inferred transmittance of an optical circulator at different ports. The 
raw traces (not shown here) were obtained using the bright supercontinuum 
output trace shown in Fig. 2(d). The spectral traces shown here are normalized 
to the output of the supercontinuum source. 
 
The broadband source was connected to the circulator and 
isolator, the devices under tests (DUTs) one by one; see the 
dashed/blue line in Fig. 2(c). All possible directions of 
transmission through these DUTs were investigated. Fig. 2(d) 
shows some absolute spectral traces that can be readily 
compared with the supercontinuum output. The raw output 
spectra/traces for the forward and reverse transmission for port 
1 and 2 of the circulator are shown in red and blue, 
respectively. Similarly, the raw traces for the transmission 
through forward and reverse directions of an isolator are 
respectively given by the yellow and purple traces.  
As expected, the reverse direction of the circulator (2→1) 
exhibits high attenuation in comparison to the favoured 
direction (1→2), especially between 1550 nm and 1600 nm. 
Nevertheless, we can observe a promising behaviour, for 
example, around 1310 nm, where the transmission through the 
reverse direction is significantly higher (~40 dB) compared to 
that at 1550 nm. Similarly, the extinction ratio between the 
forward and reverse direction of the isolator is significant at 
1550 nm, roughly −50 dB, but around 1300 nm, the power 
transmitted in the reverse direction is merely 10 dB lower than 
that in the forward direction. 
For a more accurate comparison, we normalized the various 
transmission spectra to the supercontinuum source output. The 
resulting relative spectral traces are shown in Fig. 3 for the 
circulator and in Fig. 4 for the three isolators. In Fig. 3(a) and 
3(b), the favoured directions from port 1 to 2, and from port 
from port 2 to 3 show a similar transmittance. The insertion 
losses are around −2 dB for port 1 to 2, and −2.8 dB for port 
2 to 3. The maximum power transfer is observed in the 1400 -
1750 nm regime. This can be exploited to receive a back-
reflection of interest via the reverse direction of a circulator. 
The spectral transmission of light through port 1 to 3 and  
 
Fig. 4.  Inferred transmittance of the three isolators in the forward and reverse 
directions. The raw traces (not shown here) were obtained in the same way as 
in Fig. 3 and the traces shown here are also normalized to the output of the 
supercontinuum source. 
 
vice-versa shows high attenuation all over the spectrum. There 
is a slight transmission from port 1 to port 3 in the 1450 - 1700 
nm range, but the transmittance is about −40 dB; combined 
with other insertion losses, this is unlikely to aid Eve.  
Fig. 4 presents the normalized transmission traces of the 
three isolators. We do not have details about the fabrication 
process but we can distinguish them by our measurements, as 
is evident in Fig. 4. In the forward direction, at wavelengths 
longer than 1400 nm, the transmittance of all three isolators 
matches the specified insertion loss values (of around 0.5 dB). 
In the reverse direction, the attenuation levels range from  
−50 dB (iso1) to −35 dB (iso3) at 1550 nm. Also, for iso1 and 
iso2, the maximum attenuation is observed only in a rather 
narrow dip around 1550 nm. But the attenuation level at 1310 
nm in the reverse direction for iso1 is at least 30 dB lower than 
that at 1550 nm. This is certainly promising for Trojan-horse 
attacks. For iso3, the traces in both the forward and reverse 
directions are markedly different from their counterparts of 
iso1 and iso2. In general, another attack wavelength would be 
more appropriate for iso3 since the observed transmittance in 
both forward and reverse directions is quite low at 1310 nm. 
In Alice, an isolator is sometimes used just after the laser 
source in order to prevent back-reflections into the laser. Such 
a configuration could also be interesting for Eve if the isolator 
shows high back-reflections for some wavelengths. Therefore, 
we measured the reflectivity of the aforementioned isolators. 
Unfortunately (for Eve), we did not find any useful reflection 
signal which would have aided the Trojan-horse attack.  
As the principle of Trojan-horse attacks is based on sending 
a bright pulse and analyzing the back-reflected signal, the 
quantity ultimately relevant to deciding Eve’s photon budget 
see section II.A) is the net transmittance in a double pass  
 Fig. 5. Net transmittance observed in a double pass a) through the circulator 
that was characterized in Fig. 3, and b) through the three isolators that were 
characterized in Fig. 4. 
 
through the fiber-optic components. Fig. 5 shows this net 
transmittance of a pulse seen in a double pass, which means 
that the pulse has passed twice through the DUT, first in the 
forward and then in the reverse direction or vice versa. For the 
circulator (Fig. 5(a)), we observe a maximum attenuation at 
the telecom wavelength, as expected. However, the minimum 
attenuation suffered in a double pass around 1300 nm is about 
−25 dB, which seems reasonable for an attack. Note that the 
pulse also suffers a higher loss in the forward direction when 
using a wavelength other than 1550 nm.  
In Fig. 5(b), the spectral traces for the isolators reveal large 
differences in terms of the net transmittance in a double pass. 
While iso3 provides the lowest attenuation at around 1400 nm 
(−15 dB), its isolation at 1550 nm also shows the worst 
performance amongst the three isolators. The other two 
isolators show a broader spectral transmittance: for iso1, it 
interestingly is transmitting all the way to 1100 nm. The 
maximal isolation at 1550 nm is −45 dB (iso2) and −50 dB 
(iso1), but this is only in a narrow regime around 1550 nm. It 
is thus clear that even high performance isolators do not have 
high isolation in other wavelength regions, such as from 1300 
to 1400 nm, where Eve can easily obtain both laser sources 
and detectors for performing an efficient Trojan-horse attack. 
This result is however not very surprising since most isolators 
rely on the wavelength-dependent Faraday effect for their 
correct functionality. 
 
B. Reflection & transmission measurements on Clavis2-Bob 
In section II.C, we explained some of the problems and 
constraints encountered in attacking Clavis2-Bob at 1550 nm. 
In short, Bob contains the single-photon avalanche diodes 
(SPADs) that incur a strong afterpulsing from the Trojan-
horse pulses, which reveals the presence of Eve. This is due to 
the total attenuation suffered by Eve in going back and forth 
through Bob being fairly high (around −57 dB at 1550 nm).  
 
Fig. 6. Results of simple transmission and reflection measurements on 
Clavis2-Bob. (a) A supercontinuum source, with an output similar to the one 
shown in Fig. 2(c), was used. a) Simplified optical schematic of Bob. Various 
optic/optoelectronic components are connected with fibers (solid orange lines) 
using FC/PC connectors, denoted here by the small black rectangular blocks. 
The polarizing beamsplitter, 50/50 BS (beamsplitter), and circulator form a 
composite assembly in which light propagates in free space (dotted orange 
line). b) The sum total of the reflected light coming out of Bob (red trace) 
shows a perceptible variation when the FC/PC connector (port 6 in Fig. 6(a)) 
after the phase modulator (PM) is opened; see the blue trace. The traces are 
relative, i.e. they have been normalized to the original supercontinuum output. 
At around 1550 nm, the ~8 dB rise in the back-reflection (blue trace, 
compared to red trace) can be attributed to a strong Fresnel reflection from the 
connector. c) Relative transmission measurements mainly highlight the effects 
of absorption until and inside Bob's PM. All traces were measured by an 
optical spectrum analyzer (model: Anritsu AQ6317B). 
 
Eve sends less than 2106 photons per pulse into Bob, yet, the 
subsequent afterpulsing results in a huge dark count rate.   
However, as also explained in section II, both reflectivity of 
the different components and afterpulsing probability in an  
SPAD may depend on Eve’s wavelength. To elaborate, if Eve 
could send dimmer Trojan-horse pulses at a wavelength where 
she still obtains a decent back-reflection of interest (i.e., Eve 
still remains high enough to yield reasonable success during 
Eve’s measurement of the back-reflection; see section II.A.) 
and where the afterpulsing is additionally lower, the chances 
of being caught by Bob are reduced. 
In Ref. [21], we performed optical time domain 
reflectometry (OTDR) measurements for three different 
wavelengths: 808 nm, 1310 nm, and 1550 nm. Ideally, one 
should repeat such OTDR measurements at a variety of 
wavelengths to check for the reflectivity dependence. 
However, such a procedure would be extremely cumbersome 
and time-consuming. To keep matters simple, we decided to 
test the whole subsystem of Bob using a broadband source and 
an optical spectrum analyzer (OSA). In other words, Clavis2-
Bob was our device under test (DUT). Fig. 6(a) shows a 
simplified optical schematic of Clavis2-Bob. The aim of the 
Trojan-horse attack per se is to know B, the phase modulated 
by Bob on the quantum signals from Alice.  
We re-employed a supercontinuum source, similar to the 
one used earlier (see Fig. 2), for this purpose. For the 
reflection measurements, the supercontinuum was inserted 
into Bob via a pre-characterized coupler and the reflection 
traces were obtained by plugging the other input port of the 
coupler into the OSA; see the green/dotted line in Fig. 2(c). 
The absolute back-reflection measurement traces (not shown 
here) were obtained for two cases: with Bob as a whole, and 
with the output FC/PC connector of Bob's phase modulator 
(PM) additionally disconnected. Fig. 6(b) shows the traces 
normalized to the original supercontinuum just like in Fig. 3 
and 4. The traces until 1064 nm are intentionally blanked out 
since the corresponding reflections were buried in noise floor 
of the OSA. Fig. 6(c) shows the transmittance also for two 
cases: from Bob's entrance to the input FC/PC connector of 
Bob's PM and through Bob's PM. For all these measurements, 
the input polarization was adjusted to transmit the maximum 
amount of light into Bob’s PM.  
A sharp peak (dip) in the spectral reflectivity 
(transmittance) at some wavelength in the scanned range could 
have been of a great interest to an eavesdropper for launching 
a Trojan-horse attack. In that regard, the transmittance in Fig. 
6(c) does show a drop around 1170 nm (see the blue curve). 
However, there is no corresponding peak in the reflectivity 
traces. It is likely therefore that this dip comes from absorption 
(at the polarizing beamsplitter cube) instead of reflection. 
 
C. Spectral efficiency of a single-photon avalanche diode 
In section II.C, we conjectured about the lowering of the 
afterpulsing probability in gated single-photon avalanche 
diodes (SPADs) at wavelengths longer than 1550 nm. Briefly, 
an SPAD optimized to detect photons at 1550 nm would 
display a cut-off wavelength λC  > 1550 nm because a photon 
at λ beyond λC would not have sufficient energy to cross the 
bandgap [45, 46]. A lower spectral sensitivity may be seen as 
a potential indicator of lower afterpulsing: if the SPAD 
response at a wavelength far from 1550 nm is characterized by 
much smaller detection probabilities inside the gate, then the 
SPAD might prove to be less prone to afterpulses created 
outside the gate [16, 21].  
Based on this premise, we tried to measure the sensitivity of 
the SPADs in Clavis2-Bob in the 1700 - 1800 nm range, i.e., 
at wavelengths likely to be above the cut-off wavelength. We 
used the pulsed idler beam output from an optical parametric 
oscillator (OPO) for this purpose. The OPO could be scanned 
and configured to emit pulses at some desired wavelength in 
the 1680 - 2000 nm range. 
The OPO is not, or rather, cannot be synchronized to the 
SPAD gates. Also, it operates at a repetition rate of ~ 82 MHz 
which is much higher than the gating frequency (set to ~ 98.0  
Fig. 7. Spectral sensitivity of the SPAD. a) Spectral data of a typical SPAD 
from ID Quantique [17]. The shaded ellipse shape is essentially zoomed in b) 
which is based on our measurement results with the idler beam. The 
sensitivity of the SPAD in the 1700 - 1800 nm range is at least three orders of 
magnitude lower than the peak value around 1310 nm. 
 
kHz for this specific experiment [12]) of the SPADs in Bob. 
One may thus assume that the SPAD sees the light from the 
OPO as quasi-CW essentially. Based on this assumption, one 
can calculate the mean photon number 𝜇 =  𝜏𝜆𝑃𝑖/ℏ𝑐 seen 
inside a gate. Here 𝜏 ≈ 2.5 ns denotes the full width at half 
maximum value of the gate applied on the SPAD, 𝜆 and 𝑃𝑖  are 
the wavelength and average power of the idler output, 
respectively. With the setup connected to one of the detectors 
in Bob, we recorded the number of clicks 𝑛𝑐 and number of 
gates 𝑁𝑔 to evaluate the total detection probability: 
 
𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡 =
𝑛𝑐
𝑁𝑔
= 𝑑 + 𝑝µ
𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑑) 
 
where 𝑑 is the dark count probability (known value), and 
𝑝µ
𝑝ℎ = 1 − 𝑒−𝜇𝜂(𝜆) is the photonic detection probability. The 
spectral sensitivity 𝜂(𝜆) of the SPAD can therefore be 
obtained by inverting the above equation.  
Fig. 7(b) shows the results of our measurements and 
calculations (both SPADs had an almost similar spectral 
response, so we show the result for only one of them). We 
recorded the total detection probabilities at each wavelength 
shown for different values of the mean photon number 𝜇 by 
variably attenuating the idler beam. 
Compared to the response at 1550 nm, where 𝜂 ≈0.1 is a 
typical value as shown in Fig. 7(a), the SPADs are indeed 
much less spectrally sensitive in the tested regime. At λ ≈ 
1720 nm, the efficiency 𝜂 ≈ 0.05 × 10−3 indicates that it 
would be worth trying to measure the actual afterpulsing 
response at this wavelength.  Although it must be noted that 
insertion losses through fiber-optic components at λ ~ 1720 
nm are higher than at 1550 nm. To maintain the photon 
budget, as explained in section II.A, more energetic pulses 
would be required which would increase the afterpulsing 
probability. This tradeoff needs to be studied more thoroughly. 
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
To summarize, we have discussed how the wavelength 
dependence of optical devices – frequently used in practical 
fiber-optical QKD systems – can make the system more 
vulnerable to Trojan-horse attacks. In that regard, we have 
pointed out the practical limits of two measures specifically 
advertised for circumventing Trojan-horse attacks. These 
countermeasures are passive or active devices, such as an 
isolator or monitoring detector at Alice’s entrance, that can 
prevent or catch Trojan-horse pulses as and when these pulses 
try to enter into the QKD subsystem.  
In particular, we have measured the spectral transmittance of 
different isolators. While the performance in and around the 
design wavelength of 1550 nm is pretty much as expected, an 
increased risk of Trojan-horse attacks is seen at wavelengths 
far from 1550 nm. For example, Eve gets a benefit of almost 
30 dB if she chooses her attack wavelength to be around 1300 
nm. Insertion losses of most telecom components in this 
wavelength regime also do not differ much from that around 
1550 nm. In fact, in a round trip of Eve’s light, the total 
attenuation at wavelengths around 1300 nm or 1700 nm can be 
considerably lesser than at 1550 nm, as attested by the spectral 
analysis of circulators. We also note that performing a spectral 
characterization of the QKD system from the quantum channel 
is a one-time job for Eve that can be performed rather quickly, 
i.e., at the most, it may distract Alice/Bob only momentarily. 
To obtain a live signature of such attacks, Alice may also 
use a monitoring detector. Although we could not perform a 
spectral measurement of the behaviour of a classical 
monitoring detector, we did measure the spectral sensitivity of 
single-photon avalanche diodes (SPAD). The context here was 
similar: a straightforward Trojan-horse attack on Bob fails due 
to the severe afterpulsing caused by the bright pulses from 
Eve. We conjectured that a lower sensitivity at a wavelength 
longer than the peak wavelength (i.e., λ > 1550 nm) should 
also imply a lower probability of afterpulsing. Our 
experimental measurements indicate that the sensitivity of an 
SPAD in Bob in the 1700 - 1800 nm range is at least three 
orders of magnitude lower than the peak value. Although fiber 
attenuation is higher around 1700 nm, typical QKD receivers 
do not contain long fiber links. Also, as our measurement 
results have shown, the behaviour of some components such 
as isolators and circulators do not seem too inimical for Eve.  
Based on these findings, the security of a QKD system that 
uses only an isolator (in the transmitter, Alice) for protection 
against Trojan-horse attacks could be breached successfully by 
sending bright pulses around 1300 nm. Likewise, an attack on 
the receiver Bob, who contains single-photon detectors, should 
have better chances of remaining undetected if Eve prepares 
bright pulses around 1700 nm. Note that the attack against 
isolators at 1310 nm is applicable to both discrete and 
continuous variable QKD systems. We believe trying out 
proof-of-principle Trojan-horse attacks on practical QKD 
systems [19, 21] around these wavelengths (1300 nm or 1700 
nm) is the best way to check the effectiveness of existing and 
new countermeasures, and to reduce the threat of these attacks 
convincingly.  
V.  COUNTERMEASURES 
Both general and specific countermeasures against Trojan-
horse attacks have been discussed before [19-21, 23, 24]. Here 
we discuss some measures for countering Trojan-horse attacks 
based on the discussion in the previous sections.  
If Alice contains a monitoring detector in addition to the 
isolator, then it would become fairly challenging for Eve to 
simultaneously circumvent both of these countermeasures. To 
make it even more difficult, Alice could additionally insert an 
optical filter based on fiber Bragg gratings (FBGs) or Fabry-
Perot cavities, after the monitoring detector. Filters based on 
fiber Bragg gratings for example can be designed with 
different filtering widths and central wavelengths, and 
depending on the filter design [47], operate in the reflection 
mode. The transmission spectrum of commercially-available 
filters reported in datasheets is typically characterized in a 
range of 20 nm around the central wavelength. Within this 
range, the FBG transmission profile might contain secondary 
maxima which must be taken into account. However, out of 
this wavelength range, where there is a higher risk of an attack 
as our measurements have shown, the filters feature a high 
suppression of the spectral components.  
With such an optical filter, if a pulse from Eve at some 
wavelength λEve is neither made extinct by the isolator nor 
caught by the monitoring detector, then it would still not reach 
the basis selector as it would be filtered out before. A filtering 
width of a few nm should suffice to ensure undisturbed 
operation of the QKD system since all sidebands of the phase 
and intensity modulation would be within the bandwidth of the 
filter. Such a filter would also prove beneficial for the security 
of Bob.  
From a more general perspective, methods that reduce the 
intensity of back-reflections – occurring inside either Alice or 
Bob – also naturally contribute to the overall security of the 
system. Some practical examples are: using angle polished 
connectors (FC/APC) instead of flat connectors (FC/PC), re-
designing the overall system to eliminate any open ports [19], 
and fusing all connections if and when possible (instead of 
using mating sleeves). Note that these steps can limit the 
chances of an attack independent of the spectral response of 
the single optical devices.  
Finally, note that in most instances of Trojan-horse attacks, 
Eve gains only a partial but non-negligible amount of the 
secret key. From a theoretical perspective, a higher amount of 
privacy amplification can always help Alice and Bob to 
destroy the partial information of Eve. Nonetheless, to 
quantify the requisite amount of privacy amplification, one 
must carefully scrutinize each subsystem, estimate the 
maximum leakage due to Trojan-horse attacks, and 
incorporate these elements in the security proof. 
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